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a b s t r a c t
User-private information retrieval systems should protect the user’s anonymity when
performing queries against a database, or they should limit the servers capacity of profiling
users. Peer-to-peer user-private information retrieval (P2P UPIR) supplies a practical
solution: the users in a group help each other in doing their queries, thereby preserving
their privacy without any need of the database to cooperate. One way to implement the
P2P UPIR uses combinatoric configurations to administrate the keys needed for the private
communication between the peers.
This article is devoted to the choice of the configuration in this system. First of all
we characterize the optimal configurations for the P2P UPIR and see the relationship
with the projective planes as described in finite geometry. Then we give a very efficient
construction of such optimal configurations, i.e. finite projective planes. We finally check
that the involved graphs are Ramanujan graphs, giving an additional justification of the
optimality of the constructed configurations.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Public access databases are an indispensable source of information, especially when the information needs to be
constantly updated. But the databases also imply a high risk for the privacy of the users, since a curious administrator of
a database can track the queries of a user and deduce her interests and necessities. There are several disciplines studying
different aspects of privacy in communications. We will describe some of these shortly with the purpose to contrast them
with the protocol treated in this article (P2P UPIR, first described in [1]).
1.1. PIR
The discipline studying how a user should retrieve an element from a database or a search engine, without the system
or the server being able to deduce which element is the object of the user’s interest, is called PIR — Private Information
Retrieval. The name and the discipline were introduced in the works of Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz and Sudan [2,3].
A first result, found in theseworks, says that the onlyway to guarantee complete privacy,when using one single database,
is bymaking the user access all the information in the database. Because of this, the first PIR protocolswere initially designed
for situations where there exist several copies of the same database, without these copies being intercommunicated. In this
case, privacy refers to each of the servers individually [2,3].
Later, computational PIR (cPIR) was introduced, dealing with privacy against one single database [4,5]. In this case, there
is one unique server with limited computational capacity and the privacy is relaxed to computational privacy. This means
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that the computations the server has to perform in order to gather enough information on the searches of a user to vulnerate
her privacy, exceeds the capacity of the server. To distinguish the original PIR from the computational PIR, the former is called
information theoretic PIR.
A major issue with cPIR schemes is that they are computationally expensive. The database needs to process all its entries
for every query sent by the users, since otherwise it would be able to deduce in what entries the user is not interested.
New protocols have been presented lately, based on noise over lattices instead of on number theoretical problems. The
computational cost is then lowered, but communication performance obtained is worse [6]. One interesting example of this
is [7] where a higher efficiency is obtained accepting a minor probability of error in the answer of the query.
Apart from cPIR, there are PIR protocols based on the assumption that a trusted hardware is installed in the database,
so-called trusted-hardware based PIR (thPIR). This is a rather prosperous assumption, and several ideas for thPIR protocols
have been presented. However, the assumption of the existence of a trusted hardware, restricts the applications of these
protocols to particular situations.
The drawbacks we observe with the existing PIR protocols are the following:
• PIR protocols model the database as a vector in which the user knows the physical address of the item she is interested
in. This is a very unreal assumption, e.g. think of a user querying a search engine;
• Theoretical PIR protocols have complexity that is linear in the size of the database. To avoid giving the server any clues
of the interests of the user, the protocol must be such that the server process all entries in the database for every query;
• It is assumed that the database server cooperates in the PIR protocol. But it is the userwho is interested in her ownprivacy,
whereas the motivation for the database server is dubious; actually, PIR is likely to be unattractive to most companies
running queryable databases, as it limits their profiling ability.
1.2. Mixing
Digital mixes were invented by David Chaum in 1981, in order to provide anonymous email. A mix works at the network
layer, and tries to hide the meta-data associated to a communication, i.e. avoid traffic analysis. One common approach for
the construction of mixes is to use a chain of multiple untrusted relays, e.g. MorphMix [8] and Tarzan [9], but it is also
possible to use a single trusted relay, as is the case with the interesting example of PIR applied to mixing that can be found
in [10].
A well-known software, providing traffic analysis resistance for interactive communication, is Tor [11]. It is an example
of mixing using repeated public key cryptography through a chain of untrusted relays, called onion-routing. However, these
are not intended to offer private information retrieval. They protect the transport of data, but give no end-to-end protection
(at the application level). A server may link the successive queries submitted by the same user (e.g by using cookies), and in
that way be able to profile and re-identify the user.
This last observation is generally true for all systems working on the network layer, hence for all mixers. Although
anonymity on network level is achieved, so that the user’s ip is maintained in secret, the collection of network traffic
originating from her (secret) ip will reveal her by its content, e.g. through user names, query contents, etc.
1.3. Other systems
1.3.1. Goopir
In [12] a system named Goopir is proposed in which a user masks her target query by ORing it with k − 1 fake queries
and then submits the resultingmasked query to a search engine or large database which does not need to cooperate (in fact,
it does not even need to know that the user is trying to protect her privacy). Strictly speaking, Goopir does not achieve PIR
as defined above; rather, it provides h(k)-private information retrieval, in that it cloaks the target query within a set of k
queries of entropy at least h(k). This systemworks fine but it assumes that the frequencies of keywords and phrases that can
appear in a query are known and available: for maximum privacy, the frequencies of the target and the fake queries should
be similar, so that the uncertainty h(k) of the search engine about the real target query is maximum.
1.3.2. TrackMeNot
TrackMeNot [13] is a software available as a plugin for Firefox. It periodically issues randomized search queries to popular
search engines, e.g., AOL, Yahoo!, Google, and MSN. In this way it hides the users actual search trails in a cloud of ‘ghost’
queries, significantly increasing the difficulty of aggregating such data into accurate or identifying user profiles. While
practical at a small scale, if the use of TrackMeNot became generalized, the overhead introduced by ghost queries would
significantly degrade the performance of search engines and communications networks. Also, the way the automatic ghost
queries are submitted may be distinguishable from the way real queries are submitted, which could provide clues on how
to identify the latter type of queries.
1.4. UPIR
We define UPIR to be the discipline studying how a user should retrieve an element from a database or a search engine
without the system or the server being able to deduce who the retrieving user is. Since UPIR does not hide the content of
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the query for the database, but instead obstructs the possibilities for the database of profiling users, formally a UPIR protocol
does not have to be a PIR protocol.
UPIR and mixers both deal with anonymity, but the concepts are different. As we commented before, mixers provide
anonymity on the network layer, but the user can still be profiled through e.g. cookies. UPIR deals with anonymity on the
application layer.
The protocol treated in this article is Peer-to-Peer Private Information Retrieval [1,14]. The idea is that users submit
queries on behalf of other users. The way in which users share communications spaces (memory sectors and cryptographic
keys) is defined using combinatorial configurations. Regarding this protocol we consider that the following should be
stressed:
• P2P UPIR has none of the disadvantages of cPIR listed in Section 1.1, e.g. it does not need the cooperation of the server, it
has sublinear complexity, and the database does not have to be modeled as a vector. Of course it is not a fair comparison,
since the P2P UPIR protocol does something quite different from what is described in Section 1.1;
• Unlike mixers, P2P UPIR hides the profile of the user in front of the database/server. The users send queries on behalf of
others, i.e. it is something like a mixer on application level;
• Unlike Goopir, no knowledge of the frequencies of all possible keywords and phrases that can be queried is required;
• Unlike TrackMeNot, the overhead of ghost query submission is avoided.
In addition to preserving the privacy of a user’s query profile in front of the database and external intruders, P2P UPIR
offers privacy versus peer users, because peers are anonymous to each other using mixers.
As mentioned before, one way to implement P2P UPIR uses combinatoric configurations to administrate the keys needed
for the private communication between the peers [1,14]. Themain problemwhendealingwith configurations is that they are
very easy to define but not so easy to find. This work is devoted to combinatorial configurations in the context of P2P UPIR.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the P2P UPIR with combinatorial configurations.
In Section 3 we characterize the optimal configurations for the P2P UPIR and see the relationship with the projective planes
as described in finite geometry. In Section 4 we give a very efficient construction of such optimal configurations. We finally
check in Section 5 that the involved graphs are Ramanujan graphs, giving an additional justification of the optimality of the
constructed configurations.
2. Peer-to-peer private information retrieval
In the articles [1,14] a peer-to-peer user private information retrieval systemwas introduced. This is an alternative system
capable of providing user privacy against one single database.
Suppose that a community of users share a communication space formed by one memory sector and one cryptographic
key. The community users use the communication space to write their query requests, to read the query requests of other
users and then commit these, and finally to write the answers to the queries. In that way all users collaborate for the good of
the group and the database can not know who is asking what, nor elaborate any profiles, at least not more specific profiles
than one describing the entire community. This system is really good if we consider the privacy against the database, but
it is not so good when it comes to privacy between users. Actually, although it is not known who made a particular query
request, all requests from a certain user pass through the shared communication space.
We can think of another system where each user shares a different communication space with every other user. In that
way she can spreadher query requests between them. The privacy against the database ismaintained. Every user reads only a
portion of the query requests of a userwithwhomhe collaborates, but on the other hand he can be certain ofwho of the users
requested the query. In the mentioned work an intermediate solution is proposed, using combinatoric configurations. That
is, we have a set of nc communication spaces, all of them consisting of a memory sector and a cryptographic key and a set of
nu users, all of themhaving access to a subset of du communication spaces so that every communication space is shared by dc
users and every pair of users share atmost one communication space. The combinatoric configurations are the combinatoric
object defining the distribution of the users among the mentioned communication spaces. A good reference for combinato-
rial configurations is [15] and [16] is a more general reference for combinatorial designs. In [17] there are some results on
the existence of combinatorial configurations. Configurations are also called partial linear spaces or semi-linear spaces. As in
the previous systems the users in the community submit queries to the database on behalf of other users, using the different
communication spaces to request queries from the others, to read query results and to commit queries for the others.
Actually, both situations explained before, the one with a single communication space shared by the totality of the users
in the community, as well as the one with a different communication space for each pair of users, define configurations. In
the first case we have nc = 1, du = 1, dc = nu, and in the second case nc = nu(nu−1)2 , du = nu − 1, dc = 2. It is already
justified that these configurations have some deficiencies. We are now interested in verifying what kind of configuration is
the most appropriate for the scenario of peer-to-peer user-private information retrieval.
3. Optimal configurations for peer-to-peer private information retrieval
Suppose that we use a mathematical (nc, nu, dc, du)-configuration for the realization of the P2P UPIR protocol. We next
analyze its performance by means of the parameters nc , nu, dc and du. There is a well-known property of configurations
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saying that necessarily
nudu = ncdc . (1)
We have that:
• The number of required keys and memory sectors is nc = nudu/dc (by equality (1)). Therefore, as dc grows there is a
reduction in the number of required keys and memory sectors (storage efficiency);
• One can check that in a (nc, nu, dc, du)-configuration the number of blocks intersecting any specific block is du(dc − 1).
Now since the number of blocks intersecting a specific block cannot be greater than nu − 1 we get that
du(dc − 1) ≤ nu − 1. (2)
The overall number of keys stored by the users therefore satisfies
{overall number of keys} = nudu ≤ nu(nu − 1)dc − 1 , (3)
and therefore, as dc grows there is a reduction in the overall number of keys stored by the users (storage efficiency);
• In addition to storage, another performancemetric is how long it takes for a user to get her query submitted and answered.
Clearly, the greater the number dc withwhom the user shares a selected key, the shorter the expectedwaiting time (time
efficiency);
• The risk that a user can profile and thereby re-identify another user decreases as du increases, since the user then
distributes her queries to a wider subset of communication spaces (privacy in front of other users);
• The query profile of a particular user is diffused among the du(dc−1) userswithwhom the user shares a key and confused
among the other queries submitted by those users (privacy in front of database).
We therefore deduce that the privacy of the users against the database is an increasing function of du(dc − 1).
From (2) and from the fact that the privacy of the users facing the database is an increasing function of du(dc − 1), we
deduce that the parameters for an optimal configuration for the P2P UPIR, considering the privacy against the database,
should satisfy the following relation:
du(dc − 1) = nu − 1. (4)
These configurations exist, as is shown in the following example.
Example. Let nu = 9, nc = 12, du = 4 and dc = 3. Consider the following adjacency list of users and communication
spaces:
u1 : c1 c2 c3 c4
u2 : c1 c5 c6 c7
u3 : c1 c8 c9 c10
u4 : c2 c5 c8 c11
u5 : c2 c6 c9 c12
u6 : c3 c5 c10 c12
u7 : c3 c7 c9 c11
u8 : c4 c6 c10 c11
u9 : c4 c7 c8 c12
c1 : u1 u2 u3
c2 : u1 u4 u5
c3 : u1 u6 u7
c4 : u1 u8 u9
c5 : u2 u4 u6
c6 : u2 u5 u8
c7 : u2 u7 u9
c8 : u3 u4 u9
c9 : u3 u5 u7
c10 : u3 u6 u8
c11 : u4 u7 u8
c12 : u5 u6 u9
In the following lemma we see what relation du and dc should keep for these configurations.
Lemma 1. Given a configuration with du(dc − 1) = nu − 1, we always have dc ≤ du.
Proof. Suppose as before that the user u1 is assigned the communication spaces c1, . . . , cdu . From the condition du(dc−1) =
nu − 1 we get that u2, . . . , unu are assigned to one and only one of the communication spaces c1, . . . , cdu . We also suppose,
without loss of generality, that u2 is assigned the communication spaces c1 and cj with j > du. Then each of the other dc − 1
users assigned to the space cj, should be assigned to another space between c2 and cdu . Therefore dc − 1 ≤ du − 1 and the
result follows. 
By the arguments at the beginning of the section, larger dc ’s give better performance as for storage, and shorter expected
waiting time per query. On the other hand, larger du’s give more privacy against peers. If we only focus on privacy against
the search engine then we are interested in configurations with the largest possible dc . By Lemma 1 this means that
du = dc . (5)
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Now by (1) we also have that nu = nc and therefore we are dealing with symmetric configurations. Let n := nu = nc and
d := du = dc . From the condition (4) we deduce that n = d2 − d + 1 and we also have that every pair of users share one
and only one communication space while every pair of communication spaces is assigned simultaneously to one and only
one user. In the area of finite geometry these configurations are called projective planes [18] (see Section 4 for a formal
definition). The order q of the projective plane corresponds to the value of d− 1. Hence the number of users (and memory
sectors) in the configuration, i.e. the number of points (and lines) in the projective plane is n = d2 − d+ 1 = q2 + q+ 1.
We conclude that the optimal configurations for the peer-to-peer user-private information retrieval are, indeed, the
projective planes. It is known that projective planes of order q exist whenever q is a power of a prime number, but when q
is an integer in general the existence is not guaranteed. Actually there is not a single known example of a projective plane
where q is not a power of a prime. In [18] it is specified that the existence of projective planes of arbitrary orders is one of
the most difficult questions within finite geometry.
In our discussionwedidnot take into account theprivacy against other peers. Alternative solutions for avoiding collusions
of peers are analyzed in [19].
4. Construction of the optimal configurations
A standard construction of a finite projective plane of order q uses homogeneous coordinates over the finite field of order
q. This method gives us one plane of every order q: P(Fq). Many more projective planes can be constructed using algebraic
structures with less postulates than fields. M. Hall defined the concept of ternary ring (see below) as the algebraic structure
that exactly corresponds to the structure needed in the construction of projective planes [20,21].
Another very simple construction is given by the existence in some projective planes of the so-called Singer cycles. The
projective planes that have Singer cycles can be constructed by defining the lines of the plane as the successive translations
of a difference set. Apart from being a very simple construction (once given a difference set), it gives a compact way of
representing the projective plane, since defining one of the lines is enough to deduce the entire plane. However, not all
planes can be constructed in this way and, more important, constructing a difference set is equivalent to constructing a
projective plane.
When q is prime there is a rather straightforward algorithm for constructing P(Fq). We will here give one variant of
this straightforward algorithm an efficient and explicit expression, at the same time generalizing it in order to be able
to efficiently construct any projective plane (whenever it exists). In particular we construct projective planes of order a
power of a prime number, using an algorithm that is efficient and of easy implementation. The generalization uses the
mathematical structure ternary ring, which was first introduced by Hall as a tool for his construction and classification of
projective planes [20]. Any ternary ring will give us a projective plane and any projective plane defines a ternary ring [22].
Ternary rings make possible a general formulation of the algorithm, and simplify the proof. The reader who only needs an
efficient algorithm to calculate a projective plane, and does not care about fancy mathematical concepts, can take only a
quick glance at Proposition 4, skip the proof and go straight to the examples.
Observe that the concept of ternary ring has little to dowith the concept of a ring. A ternary ring has one ternary operation,
while a ring has two binary operations.
Definition 2 (Ternary Ring). A ternary ring is a set Rwith two distinguished elements 0,1 and a ternary operation T : R3 → R
satisfying the following conditions:
• (T1) T (1, a, 0) = T (a, 1, 0) = a for all a ∈ R;
• (T2) T (a, 0, c) = T (0, a, c) = c for all a, c ∈ R;
• (T3) If a, b, c ∈ R, the equation T (a, b, y) = c has a unique solution y;
• (T4) If a, a′, b, b′ ∈ R and a 6= a′, the equations T (x, a, b) = T (x, a′, b′) have a unique solution x in R;
• (T5) If a, a′, b, b′ ∈ R and a 6= a′, the equations T (a, x, y) = b, T (a′, x, y) = b′ have a unique solution x, y in R.
Since we are only interested in finite projective planes, and therefore only in finite ternary rings, we can forget about
(T5). When R is finite, the condition (T5) is redundant.
Also it can be useful to have the definition of a projective plane fresh in memory while following the proof.
Definition 3. A projective plane is a set of elements called points, together with a family of subsets called lines, satisfying
the following axioms:
• (P1) Any two distinct points belong to exactly one line;
• (P2) Any two distinct lines meet in exactly one point;
• (P3) There exists a quadrilateral; a set of four points, no three on any line.
We will represent a finite projective plane using an adjacency list, i.e. a list of the subsets defining the lines of the plane,
using the set of integers {1, . . . , n} to represent the points.
The following defines a general and efficient algorithm for the construction of finite projective planes.
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Proposition 4. Let R be a ternary ring with q elements R0 = {0, . . . , Rq−1} and ternary operation T . Let ι(Ri) = i. Consider the
matrix A = (ai,j) defined by
ai,j = 2+ iq+ j,
with i ∈ {0, . . . , q} and j ∈ {0, . . . , q− 1}, and the q matrices B0 = (b0i,j), B1 = (b1i,j), . . . , Bq−1 = (bq−1i,j ) defined by
bki,j = 2+ (j+ 1)q+ ι(T (Rj, Rk, Ri)),




























Proof. First we observe that in the (q+ 1)× qmatrix A, all numbers in {2, . . . , q2 + q+ 1} appear once.
Now let A′ be the matrix A, dropping the first row, i.e. the row containing the numbers {2, . . . , p + 1}. We observe that
by property T2 the matrix B0 is A′ transposed, and therefore no two numbers appearing in the same row in A′ (and hence in
A) can appear in the same row in B0.
Consider now the construction of the matrices Bk. In every column bj of Bk, the elements
bki,j = 2+ (j+ 1)q+ ι(T (Rj, Rk, Ri))
by property T3 take all the values in
{2+ (j+ 1)q, . . . , 1+ (j+ 2)q}, (6)
as i goes through {0, . . . , q− 1}. We will call (6) the element sequence of column bj.
Each of these sequences corresponds to the elements in a row of A′, so if two numbers appear in the same row in A they
can not appear in the same row in Bk for any k.
On the other hand, all the sequences are disjoint, so all numbers in {q+2, . . . , q2+q+1} appear exactly once in each Bk.
Consequently, the only case in which two elements may still coincide in more than two rows is when the two rows belong







k′ + 2 Bk′
...

with k 6= k′.
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Suppose that these two rows are the ith row in (k+2|Bk) and the i′th row in (k′+2|Bk′). Let the two repeated elements be
bkij and b
k
ij′ , with j 6= j′. Since the set of elements of the jth column in Bk is the same as the set of elements of the jth column in
Bk
′
, and the analogous case is true for the j′th column, we must have bkij = bk′i′j and bkij′ = bk
′
i′j′ , i.e. T (Rj, Rk, Ri) = T (Rj, R′k, R′i).
By condition T4 it must be j = j′, a contradiction. 
Proposition 5. The computational cost of the algorithm given by Proposition 4 is O(q3), provided that q is prime and that the
ternary ring we use corresponds to the arithmetic of Fq. In particular the number of operations used in each case is
• Additions: q+ q2 + 2q3;
• Multiplications: q+ q2 + 2q3;
• Modulo operations: q3.
Proof. The matrix A needs q(q + 1) multiplications and 2q(q + 1) additions. If we do not count addition of the constant
2 we get q(q + 1) additions. The matrix Bk needs 2q2 multiplications, q2 modulo operations and 4q2 additions. If we
continue not counting addition of the constants 1 and 2 we get 2q2 additions. Considering that k ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1} we get
q(q+1)+q(2q2) = q+q2+2q3multiplications, q(q+1)+q(2q2) = q+q2+2q3 additions and q3modulo operations. 
In order to clarify how to implement the algorithm, we will now see some examples. In the following, if nothing else is said,
the operations+ and · stand for ordinary integer sum and product.
Example. (Z/pZ,+, ·), the integersmodulo a prime number p, give rise to a ternary ringwith ternary operation T (x, y, z) =
xy+ z (mod p). With the notation from Proposition 4 we calculate A = (ai,j) using
ai,j = 2+ ip+ j,
and for k ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}we calculate Bk = (bki,j) using
bki,j = 2+ (j+ 1)p+ [i+ jk (mod p)] ,
with i ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1} and j ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}.












1 2 3 4
1 5 6 7
1 8 9 10
1 11 12 13
2 5 8 11
2 6 9 12
2 7 10 13
3 5 9 13
3 6 10 11
3 7 8 12
4 5 10 12
4 6 8 13
4 7 9 11

.
Example. The integersmodulo p prime is a finite field of order prime. For every q = pn power of a prime, there is a finite field
Fq generalizing the nice behavior of Z/pZ. A finite field Fq defines a ternary ring with ternary operation T (x, y, z) = xy+ z,
where the sum and the product follows the arithmetic rules of Fq. With the notation from Proposition 4 we calculate
A = (ai,j) using
ai,j = 2+ iq+ j.
We represent the elements of Fq with the integers in the array F = (0, . . . , q− 1). With the zero of the field represented as
0 and the unit represented as 1, the elements of the matrices Bk, for k ∈ {0, . . . , q− 1}, can now be calculated as
bki,j = 2+ (j+ 1)q+ [Fi + Fk−1Fj],
with i ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1} and j ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1}. The arithmetic of the elements of the array F must follow the arithmetic
rules of Fq.
Observe that the previous example is a special case of this example.
K. Stokes, M. Bras-Amorós / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 59 (2010) 1568–1577 1575
We now present the result from this construction for q = 4.
C4 =

1 2 3 4 5
1 6 7 8 9
1 10 11 12 13
1 14 15 16 17
1 18 19 20 21
2 6 10 14 18
2 7 11 15 19
2 8 12 16 20
2 9 13 17 21
3 6 11 16 21
3 7 10 17 20
3 8 13 14 19
3 9 12 15 18
4 6 12 17 19
4 7 13 16 18
4 8 10 15 21
5 6 13 15 20
5 7 12 14 21
5 8 11 17 18
5 9 10 16 19

.
In this article the focus is on constructing optimal configurations for P2P UPIR, and it is probably enough with one
configuration for a given d = q − 1. It is conjectured that all projective planes have order a power of a prime number.
Therefore it is highly probable that all projective planes constructed by our algorithm will have this property. The finite
projective planes constructed using finite fields constitute a subset of all finite projective planes, with the particularity that
they satisfy the theorem of Desargues. Although the existence of finite fields is restricted to q a power of a prime number,
since there always exists one finite field for every q, we will always get at least one projective plane of order q, using the
previous example. It is therefore of little interest to continue the examples further.
Observe though that some projective planes constructed using less ‘regular’ (i.e. satisfying less axioms) ternary rings
could be interesting when some properties associated to the theorem of Desargues are to be avoided.
5. The optimal configurations are Ramanujan graphs
A network is efficient if the information held by a particular node can be transmitted in a fast way to all the other nodes.
To formulate this idea mathematically, the network is represented by a graph and every node by a vertex in the graph. Two
vertices are adjacent if the corresponding nodes have direct communication.
Of course, the information is transmittedwith the highest efficiencywhen the network is a complete graph, that is, when
every pair of nodes is connected. But from a practical point of view, the complete connection is not viable. Rather, it is to
prefer if the graph has few edges. The objective then is to maximize the border of every set of vertices, where the border of
the set of vertices V is the set of vertices not in V being adjacent to some vertex in V . Graphswith a good relation between the
border and the number of vertices for every subset V are called good expander graphs. There are plenty of applications for
good expanders graphs. Some of these are construction of error correcting codes, construction of intense access networks,
generation of pseudo-random numbers, randomized and derandomized algorithms, computational complexity theory and
parallel architectures [23].
Given a graph with m vertices, its adjacency matrix is the square and symmetric matrix A = (ai,j) of dimension m × m
such that ai,j = 1 if there is an edge between the ith and the jth vertex and ai,j = 0 if there is not. The expansion degree
of a graph has to do with the eigenvalues of its adjacency matrix. If a graph is d-regular (every vertex is connected to
exactly d other vertices) and connected, then the eigenvalues of its adjacency matrix λ0 ≥ λ1 ≥ · · · ≥ λm−1 satisfy
d = λ0 ≥ λ1 ≥ · · · ≥ λm−1 ≥ −d. Ramanujan graphs are a very important example of good expanders.
Definition 6. Given a connected and d-regular graph Gwith eigenvalues of its adjacency matrix λ0 ≥ λ1 ≥ · · · ≥ λm−1 we
define λ(G) = max|λi|<d |λi|. We say that the graph is Ramanujan if λ(G) is defined and λ(G) ≤ 2
√
d− 1.
Lubotzky, Phillips and Sarnak [24] described amethod to construct infinite families of Ramanujan graphs using quotients
of quaternions and defining the Cayley graph with vertices in PGL2(Fq) for q prime. One extension of this construction was
elaborated by Morgenstern [25] for q power of a prime. In general, the constructions in the existing literature use quite
complex mathematical concepts, not suitable for an engineering context.
The configurations defined by the projective planes (hence optimal configurations for P2P UPIR) are a particular case of
the graphs treated in [26] and, as is proved there, they therefore are Ramanujan graphs. However wewill with the following
give a direct and simple proof of this property.
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Consider a projective plane with n = q2 + q+ 1 points and the same number of lines, so that there are d = q+ 1 points
on every line and q+ 1 lines passing through every point, with no two (different) points on more than one line.
Consider a bipartite graph with n+ n vertices corresponding to the n points together with the n lines, so that the vertex
that corresponds to a point is incident exactly with the vertices corresponding to the lines containing the point.
Lemma 7. Let A be the adjacency matrix of the bipartite graph corresponding to a projective plane of order q. We have
A2 =

q+ 1 1 . . . 1 0 0 . . . 0









1 1 . . . q+ 1 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0 q+ 1 1 . . . 1









0 0 . . . 0 1 1 . . . q+ 1

.
Proof. This is because the square of the adjacency matrix of a graph, in position i, j has the number of paths of length two
between the ith and the jth vertex. 
Lemma 8. The eigenvalues of the matrix A2 in the previous lemma are (q+ 1)2 and q.
Proof. The vectors
(0, . . . , 0, 1(j), 0, . . . , 0,−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
q2+q+1
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
q2+q+1
),
with j ∈ 1, . . . , q2 + q and
(0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
q2+q+1
, 0, . . . , 0, 1(j), 0, . . . , 0,−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
q2+q+1
),
with j ∈ 1, . . . , q2 + q, are all linearly independent and they are eigenvectors for the eigenvalue q. On the other hand the
vectors
(1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
q2+q+1
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
q2+q+1
)
(0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
q2+q+1
, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
q2+q+1
)
are linearly independent and also linearly independent to the previous eigenvectors, being eigenvectors for the eigenvalue
(q+ 1)2. As these vectors together form a base, there are no more eigenvalues. 
Theorem 9. The bipartite graph corresponding to a projective plane is a Ramanujan graph.
Proof. Let A be the adjacency matrix of the bipartite graph corresponding to a projective plane. The squares of the
eigenvalues of A must be eigenvalues of A2. From Lemma 8 we get that the only possible eigenvalues of A are ±(q + 1)
and±√q. 
Observe that since A is an adjacency matrix of a bipartite graph, it has a symmetric spectrum with respect to the origin.
Hence the eigenvalues of A are exactly
• q+ 1 (with multiplicity 1),
• −(q+ 1) (with multiplicity 1),
• √q (with multiplicity q2 + q) and finally
• −√q (with multiplicity q2 + q).
Since we already proved the optimality of the projective planes as configurations for the P2P UPIR, the fact that they are
also Ramanujan graphsmay seem to be superfluous knowledge (in the context of P2P UPIR). However, it is useful knowledge
considering that it helps to understand the optimality from another point of view. Also, knowing that the projective planes
have the Ramanujan property is valuable per se.
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6. Conclusion
In this article we have proved that the optimal configurations for the P2P UPIR protocol presented in [1,14] are the finite
projective planes. We have also presented an efficient and explicit algorithm for the construction of finite projective planes.
Finally we have given another aspect of the optimality of finite projective planes; giving a short proof of the fact that they
are Ramanujan graphs.
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